Effective responses to climate change may demand a radical shift in human lifestyles away 20 from self-interest for material gain, towards self-restraint for the public good. The challenge 21 then lies in sustaining cooperative mitigation against the temptation to free-ride on others' 22 contributions, which can undermine public endeavours. When all possible future scenarios 23 entail costs, however, the rationale for contributing to a public good changes from altruistic 24 sacrifice of personal profit to necessary investment in minimizing personal debt. Here we 25 demonstrate analytically how an economic framework of costly adaptation to climate change 26 can sustain cooperative mitigation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We develop game-27 theoretic scenarios from existing examples of insurance for adaptation to natural hazards 28 exacerbated by climate-change that bring the debt burden from future climate events into the 29 present. We model the as-yet untried potential for leveraging public contributions to 30 mitigation from personal costs of adaptation insurance, by discounting the insurance premium 31 in proportion to progress towards a mitigation target. We show that collective mitigation 32 targets are feasible for individuals as well as nations, provided that the premium for 33 adaptation insurance in the event of no mitigation is at least four times larger than the 34 mitigation target per player. This prediction is robust to players having unequal 35 vulnerabilities, wealth, and abilities to pay. We enumerate the effects of these inequalities on 36 payoffs to players under various sub-optimal conditions. We conclude that progress in 37 mitigation is hindered by its current association with a social dilemma, which disappears upon 38 confronting the bleak consequences of inaction. 39
General model 163
We wish to identify an optimal voluntary contribution by households for maximizing a 164 collective mitigation target. As a two-strategy public-goods game, the alternative payoffs to a 165 player for cooperating or defecting depend on what others do (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005) . 166 Table 1 shows the payoff matrix for a player of each strategy sampled from a finite population 167 of n players (n households in our example). This is a version of an ecological Lotka-Volterra 168 model of competition between two species or two phenotypes, constructed as a game between 169 of two-strategies (Doncaster et al., 2013a, b) . 'Premium' is the personal cost of mandatory 170 insurance to cover adaptation to a catastrophe in the absence of mitigation. 'Contribution' is a 171 voluntary contribution per player towards a collective target for mitigation. 'Pot' is the size of 172 collective pot as a fraction of target, or as a fraction of its maximum size with pure 173 cooperation if this is less than target; it can take any value between zero and unity. 174
Cooperators pay the voluntary contribution, plus the premium discounted by the achieved 175 fraction of target; defectors pay only the premium discounted by the achieved fraction of 176 target. Self-interested players cooperate with a probability defined by their payoffs for 177 unilateral interactions: Temptation, T (free-ride on others' contributions) and Sucker, S 178 (contribute when others do not), relative to mutual interactions: Reward, R (everyone 179 contributes) and Penalty, P (nobody contributes). The Table-1 payoff matrix summarizes the  180 problem at hand: a target for voluntary mitigation, combined with a mandatory insurance cost9 that declines with achieved fraction of target, creates a two-strategy game for n players that 182 either cooperate with, or defect from, contributions to the mitigation target. 183
Table 1 184
Matrix of payoffs for a player of the row strategy in the environment of the column strategy. The payoffs to each player in an environment of n -1, n -2, n -3, …, 0 cooperators decline 186 linearly, from R to S for a cooperator and from T to P for a defector. 
Wealth equality 198
Here we develop the theory of two-strategy games that identifies the optimal contribution to 199 achieve or approach a given target for collective mitigation, at a given premium for personal 200 adaptation insurance. We assume unordered and uncoordinated (homogeneous) interactions 201 amongst independent players. The homogeneity implies equal wealth in the sense of players 202 10 not differing in their abilities to pay the mandatory premium or voluntary contribution. We 203 will expand the model to address unequal wealth in the next section. 204
The probability of defection y by a payoff-maximizing player drawn from an infinite 205 population of players has the following strict Nash equilibrium: 206 , with a stable mixed strategy, 1 > y * > 0, on conditions S > P and T > R (a Snowdrift game: 207
Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). Pure defection (stable y * = 1, a Prisoner's Dilemma) results 208 from failing condition S > P only; pure cooperation (stable y * = 0, a Harmony game) results 209 from failing condition T > R only; bi-stability (stable y * = 0 or 1, a Stag-Hunt game) results 210 from failing both conditions (Doncaster et al., 2013a ). An infinitely large population would by 211 definition have an infinitely small value of C in the local currency (£ in our national-scale 212 example). Under a widely applicable scenario, which we assume here, y * is the Pareto optimal 213 (evolutionarily stable) fraction of defectors in a finite random sample of n payoff-maximizing 214 players (Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010) . Specifically, the scenario assumes a 2n payoff matrix 215 in which the payoffs for alternative strategies adopted by a focal player decline linearly with 216 the cooperator fraction in the population, from payoffs R and T in a pure cooperator 217 population to payoffs S and P respectively in a pure defector population. Table 1 thus shows  218 the corners of a 2×n payoff matrix on the assumption of proportionate payoffs in the 219 intervening cells. 220
The always-negative R and P payoffs, given by the costs of the contribution and 221 premium respectively (Table 1 ), mean that S expresses alternative types of costly cooperation, 222 depending on its relationship to P. If S > P, cooperation can persist amongst homogeneous 223 interactions with S as a sustainable cost of hosting freeloader defectors, who are parasitic in 224 the broad sense that they drive the unilateral interaction (Doncaster et al., 2013a) . 225
Alternatively, If P ≥ S, then S is a cost of strongly altruistic cooperation that is a stable 226 strategy only if cooperators interact preferentially amongst like types (enumerated in section 0 227 below). It presents a social dilemma when the payoffs for defection exceed those for 228 cooperation (P > S and/or T > R) whilst collective welfare pays better than individual welfare 229 (2R > T + S, Macy and Flache, 2002) . 230
Substitution of the Table- defection results from failing the left-hand condition only, pure cooperation from failing the 234 right-hand condition only, and bi-stability from failing both conditions. Note that any 235 contribution ≤ premium has a bi-stable outcome at pot = 0, which means it repels the defector 236 fraction y away from equilibrium y * towards a pure strategy. Thus in the particular case of 237 such a game starting at y = 1, its initial state of pure defection resists invasion by cooperation 238 and the pot stays empty. If it starts at y < 1, however, the presence of cooperation ensures pot 239 > 0, potentially allowing escape from pure defection. The following analyses assume a start at 240 y = 0 in order to prevent initial strategies from dictating the game outcome. Section 3.4 below 241
simulates an example of a mechanism for ensuring it. 242
The predicted pot amassed by the equilibrium fraction of cooperators equals the 243 contribution valued as a multiple of C (the per capita collective target), weighted by 244 equilibrium cooperation: 245
The contribution that maximizes pot * is obtained by substitution of equation (2) contribute to mitigation may achieve the mitigation target without coordinating mechanisms. 254
We use equations (2) and (3) to assess under which conditions Proposition 1 holds. The 255 optimal contribution for achieving closest to target (including target success itself) is the 256 contribution at pot at pot * = 1. This function expresses minor and major contributions ≥ 1C that both achieve the 264 target, associated with minor and major mixed-equilibrium defection (bottom rows of Table  265 2). 266
Table 2 267
Optimal contribution for achieving closest to target, and associated stable defector 268 probability y*, for a given premium. Currency unit C = target/n for a population of size n. 270
Having determined the optimal contribution and defector fraction in terms of premium 271 size (Table 2) , we predict the achieved fraction of target and the consequent payoff to players 272 also as functions of premium size. We summarize these insights in the following proposition. 273
Proposition 2: The size of premium determines the fraction of players that cooperate, 274 their optimal contribution for maximizing the collective mitigation target, the achieved 275 fraction of target, and the average outlay per player. 276
The average payoff per player is an outlay that is summed from the contribution 277 weighted by equilibrium cooperation, plus the premium discounted in proportion to the size of 278 collective pot: 279
Wealth inequality 280
The personal payoff from helping another with shared characteristics has both direct and 281 indirect components, which are aggregated by 'inclusive fitness' (Hamilton, 1964) . In terms 282 of collective mitigation, a player gains indirect benefit when some of the benefit to others 283 from its own contribution to emissions reduction feeds back to itself. Such feedbacks arise 284
wherever players have a vested interest in each other's wealth, for example within a 285 population of individuals that funds public services through taxes, or within a set of nation 286
states that share trade agreements or subsidies. In the case of a population with unequally 287 distributed wealth, indirect benefits are obtained in emissions reduction for players that 288 subsidise those with lower ability to pay premiums. Here we enumerate wealth inequality 289 amongst players as the assortment of interactions in the form of interests in each other's 290 wealth that resolves differences in their capacity for cooperation. 291
In the two-strategy game, direct payoffs with P ≥ S have a Prisoner's Dilemma outcome 292 that resists invasion by the cooperative strategy under homogeneous interactions. They may 293 yet have inclusive payoffs S i > P i , however, that allow equilibrium cooperation. The threshold 294 at which inclusive payoffs escape the Prisoner's Dilemma is set by Hamilton's rule 295 (Hamilton, 1964) : -cost + rbenefit > 0, where cost is the net direct costs to the donor of 296 cooperation, benefit is the direct benefit to the recipient of the donor's cooperation, and r is a 297 'relatedness' coefficient that enumerates assortment of interactions with a value between 0 298 and 1. In effect, cooperation persists if the cost of benefitting another is outweighed by the 299 benefit returned through shared interests. Expressed in terms of the negative Table-1 payoffs  300 for interactions between strategies, a cooperator obtains net payoff S -P from benefitting 301 another, and the beneficiary receives payoff T = S -R from the interaction. This means that P 302 -S defines cost, and -T defines the cost-cancelling benefit of which fraction r returns to the 303 cooperator through interactions with like types. Hamilton's rule is then: 304
For the population of n players, the assortment of interactions is defined by with a stable mixed strategy, 1 > y
Pure defection results from failing the left-hand condition only, pure cooperation 316 from failing the right-hand condition only, and bi-stability from failing both conditions. 317 Equation (7) shows larger values of r decreasing defection at given values of premium, 318 contribution, and pot < 1, but r ceasing to have an effect upon achieving the target (pot = 1). 319
The optimal contribution for achieving closest to target, and the associated y We illustrate the properties of r by considering an application of the two-strategy game to 327 nation states as players, starting with a simplified scenario of a group of nation-players that 328
contribution r pot premium y pot premium
are equally wealthy in terms of their ability to pay a premium. Suppose they owe 20% of this 329 wealth on average to trade agreements between them. They might each owe 20%, or one 330 nothing and another 40%, and so on. The nations take relatedness coefficient r = 0.2. Its value 331 has quantifiable impacts on the optimal contribution for the collective mitigation target and 332 equilibrium defection, and consequently on the achieved fraction of target and average payoff 333 per player. These impacts are enumerated by equations (3) and (4), given (7) (Appendix A). 334
In an alternative scenario, the group of nations may have no trade agreements but 335 unequal wealth in terms of ability to pay the premium. For the purposes of the Table-1  336 framework, the value of r is the average proportionate redistribution of wealth amongst them 337 that resolves this discrepancy. For example, r = 0.2 when the discrepancy is resolved by a 338 20% redistribution of wealth available for paying the premium. Thus, r = 0.2 when all nations 339 have equal ability to pay after one has subsidised four others each to the value of 25% of the 340 premium; equally r = 0.2 when equality is obtained by four nations each subsidizing a fifth 341 nation to the value of 25% of the premium. We assume that subsidies are paid through an 342 intermediary such as the World Bank, to prevent donors from taking ownership of recipients' 343 choices in paying the contribution. A fully subsidized recipient stands to benefit from paying 344 the contribution just as any other player, by holding on to all of the unspent premium in the 345 event of target success, or otherwise fraction pot * of it. 346
Combining the trade-agreement and subsidy scenarios, a group of nations may be 347 connected by trade agreements, and by subsidies that resolve outstanding wealth inequalities. 348
In the Table-1 
Well-mixed populations of independent players 384
The principal finding is that successful achievement of the collective target for mitigation 385 requires a premium for adaptation insurance worth at least four times the value of the target 386 per capita (i.e., ≥ 4C, Fig. 2a-d ). This validates Proposition 1. Premiums < 4C result in an 387 average payoff as much as 42% worse than the payoff for achieving the target (Fig. 2d line) . 388
For premiums up to 1C (worth £49.24 in the example application), everyone defects (Fig. 2b)  389 because the achievable fraction of target is too small for any resulting discount on the 390 premium to compensate for paying a contribution even if everyone contributed to the 391 collective pot. Premiums ≥ 1C initiate cooperation because the average payoff is then better 392 than the -premium that obtains with pure defection. For premiums between 1C and 2C 393 (£49.24-£98.48), the payoff for everyone cooperating with an optimal contribution cannot be 394 bettered by defection (shifting the game from Prisoner's Dilemma to Harmony). Full 395 cooperation fails to achieve the target at these low premiums, and average payoff falls below 396 -1C (Fig. 2c-d lines) . Higher premiums up to 4C (£196.97) sustain increasing amounts of 397 defection from paying the optimal contribution (shifting the game from Harmony to 398 Snowdrift). Defection rises from zero to half the population of players (Fig. 2b line) , as pot * 399 rises to achieve the target at a premium of 4C (Fig. 2c line) and an average payoff of -1C 400 (Fig. 2d line) . This lowest target-achieving premium is also predicted directly from 401 substitution of equation (2) A discontinuity occurs at the premium of 4C (Fig. 2a-b 
lines). For higher values, target 412
success is achieved either by high cooperation with a minor contribution or by low 413 cooperation with a major contribution. The minor optimal contribution declines rapidly from 414 2C towards convergence with 1 + 1/premium, while the associated defection declines towards 415 convergence with 1/premium (Fig. 2a-b continuous lines) . The alternative major optimal 416 contribution rises towards convergence with premium -1, while the major defection 417 probability rises towards convergence with 1 -1/premium (Fig. 2a-b dashed lines) . We focus 418 on the minor contribution and defection as best suited to a government-driven initiative, 419 whilst noting that the major contribution and defection may provide an alternative route to 420 success given rising intra-and international disparities in wealth. 421
For any premium of at least 4C, target success with both minor and major optimal 422 contributions ( Fig. 2c line) sets average payoff at a constant -1C (Fig. 2d line) . Although 423 cooperators obtain a worse payoff than defectors because only they pay the contribution (a 424 cost of unavoidable parasitism), this deficit diminishes for the minor contribution at larger 425 premiums as the higher cooperation sustains ever smaller contributions. Premiums less than 426 4C obtain target shortfall from the optimal contribution, which worsens the average payoff for 427 premiums down to 1C. With premiums below 1C attracting no cooperation with 428 contributions, they obtain payoff P = -premium. These predictions demonstrate the 429 strengthening motivation for achieving the mitigation target with higher premiums above 4C. 430
For premiums below 4C, they demonstrate the cost to the collective pot and average payoff 431 from undervaluing the premium for a given target, or overestimating the achievable target for 432 a given premium. 433
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Simulations of the game with the Table-1 payoff structure and stochastic defection tested  434 the sensitivity of the model to finite population sizes, and the effects of non-optimal 435 contributions. The simulations mapped y * obs closely to y * for populations of n = 5 with the 436 contribution set at optimal, and they had y * obs falling either side of y * for contributions either 437 side of the optimum (Fig. 2b circles and dots) . This close mapping for the optimal 438 contribution validates Proposition 2. Simulation outcomes show that the optimum 439 contribution for maximizing the pot also gave the optimum average payoff per capita. Despite 440 sub-optimal contributions attracting the most cooperation, their lower values reduced pot * and 441 the associated average payoffs, particularly at premiums above 4C (Fig. 2c-d, light dots) . For 442 supra-optimal contributions, the inflated defection probabilities at premiums of 4C and 443 marginally below caused substantial reductions in pot * , resulting in by far the worst of all 444 average payoffs (Fig. 2c-d, dark dots) . 445
Simulated populations of n = 500 at the optimal contribution had a more precise mapping 446 of pot * and average payoff onto analytical predictions than for n = 5 (Fig. 2e-f circles and  447 lines). Non-optimal contributions produced deviations in pot * and average payoff of similar 448 magnitude for n = 500 as for n = 5, except for premiums marginally above 1C and at 4C and 449 marginally below it. In these regions, supra-optimal contributions had less impact on pot * and 450 average payoff (Fig. 2e-f compared to c-d , dark dots) associated with less inflated defection. 451
These simulations highlight the sensitivity of the collective pot and average payoff to 452 population size in the event of overestimating the achievable target and optimal contribution. 453
Players with unequal vulnerabilities or benefits 454
The findings for the size of contribution in Fig. 2 assume that all players face the same 455 vulnerability to natural hazards covered by the insurance, and will benefit equally from 456 actions funded by the collective pot. To accommodate the reality of heterogeneity in the 457 geographic spread of risk and benefit requires matching any regional variation in market price 458 22 for the premium with variation in either the optimal contribution or the distribution of action 459 funded by the collective pot, or both. In effect, having created an insurance market, its 460 regional variability can set the scale at which to determine the optimal contribution from the 461 predicted defector fraction. The analytical method is the same, whether applied once to a 462 nation of citizens or repeatedly to independent regional or local populations. 463
Players with wealth inequalities 464
Shared interests amongst players, expressed by r > 0, raise the optimal contribution for 465 premiums of 1C to 4C (Fig. 3a) . Although the higher contribution raises equilibrium 466 defection (Fig. 3b) , the net effect is to increase the achieved fraction of target and average 467 payoff ( Fig. 3c-d) . Total co-dependency, at r = 1, means that self-interest aligns precisely with 468 public interest regardless of premium. Despite r > 0 raising pot * , target success itself always 469 depends solely on the premium being at least four times larger than the per capita target. 470
Premiums ≥ 4C completely align private with public interests by virtue of the target success, 471 with the same minor and major optimal contributions and y * as at r = 0, and with the same 472 average payoff of -1C (Fig. 3a-d) . Simulations with 5 players achieve approximate alignment 473 with predictions ( Fig. 3b-d) , which becomes precise with 500 players, as at r = 0. These 474 variations of Fig. 3 from Fig. 2 
confirm Proposition 3. 475
Any positive effects of r on pot * and average payoff apply regardless of the source of 476 interdependence through interests in each other's wealth. Where the interdependence arises 477 from wealth inequalities, we have assumed that subsidies resolve differences in ability to pay 478 the premium and willingness to pay the contribution. Given that condition, our general 479 inference is that wealth inequalities make no difference for premiums ≥ 4C, while for lower 480 premiums they increase the power to leverage mitigation by discounting the premium. 481
Residual differences in ability to pay the premium that are not resolved by subsidies, 482 however, may lead to poorer players defaulting on payments of both contribution and 483 23 premium. Their participation ceases in that event, which reduces the size of n and therefore 484 raises the value of C, assuming an unchanged mitigation target. The overall consequence for 485 all remaining participants is that the minimum target-achieving premium of 4C will cost more 486 in the local currency, as will the optimal contribution and the average payoff. 487 488 
Discussion

494
The analysis shows how mitigation that reduces the premium on mandatory insurance can be 495 funded through voluntary contributions. Specifically, it illustrates three intuitive findings. A 496 24 premium at least four times larger than the per capita mitigation target provides sufficient 497 motivation for payoff maximizing players to achieve the target even without coordinating 498 mechanisms (Proposition 1). Moreover, smaller premiums underachieve relative to the target, 499 with a worse average payoff per capita (Proposition 2), although the target fraction is raised 500 and average payoff improved by subsidies between players that resolve wealth inequalities 501 (Proposition 3). This final result is an example of wealth inequalities raising efficiency in the 502 management of a public good (Baland and Platteau, 1997) . 503
Mandatory adaptation incentivizes voluntary mitigation 504
Policy makers increasingly favour voluntary policies for environmental protection, in the 505 form of self-regulation, negotiated agreements and public programmes (Segerson, 2013) voluntary policies to outperform business-as-usual scenarios, however, depends on their 511 effectiveness in improving both environmental outcomes and cost-effectiveness to 512 participants. In the context of corporate targets to regulate environmental pollution, a 513 voluntary policy can sustain free-riders provided a subset of polluters experience a cost of 514 voluntary participation that is less than the costs they would incur under the alternative policy 515 (Dawson and Segerson, 2008) . Coupling the voluntary approach with an underlying 516 regulatory structure has the potential to increase its effectiveness, depending on the cost of 517 counterfactual scenarios (Segerson and Miceli, 1998; Segerson, 2013 ). Here we have 518 quantified how the counterfactual of costly future adaptation brings resilience to the 519 effectiveness of voluntary mitigation, which it otherwise lacks in terms of achieving both a 520 public target and private cost-effectiveness. 521
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The collective mitigation target is achievable amongst homogeneous interactions 522 provided that: (i) players face a cost to themselves from no mitigation of at least 4C (£196.97 523 for the UK scheme), and (ii) mitigation funded by achieving the target will have sufficient 524 impact to nullify this cost. While mitigation demands an immediate investment, the 525 consequences of inaction will be realized in a longer-term cost of adaptation. Our approach to 526 aligning public with private needs is predicated on the reality of the individual's tendency for 527 future discounting, in which distant costs are not addressed given the relative importance of 528 nearer costs (e.g. Pryce et al., 2011) . We assume that the insurance industry depends on the 529 application of reasonable functions for discounting the future, in order to satisfy shareholders 530 that they will not face bankruptcy due to potentially infinite insurance pay-outs. Uncertainty about when climate change will tip into a catastrophe, or what target will 543 prevent it, may fatally delay cooperative action (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2014; Dannenberg 544 et al., 2015) . Our use of collective mitigation to discount the insurance premium directly 545 addresses this uncertainty, because the size of the premium determines the maximum 546 26 achievable target (e.g., premiums < 4C cannot achieve target at equilibrium defection: Figs 2-547 3). With a commercially set premium, adaptation insurance offers a free market for informed 548 personal decisions on the collective mitigation that yields premium discounts. Any 549 uncertainty about the sufficiency of the mitigation target provides a market incentive to 550 reduce the rate of discounting the future (Wagner and Weitzman, 2015) , and thereby to raise 551 the premium. This in turn raises the commitment to cooperative action that generates 552 discounts ( Fig. 2b; cf. Lewandowsky et al., 2014) . We have assumed that mitigation reduces 553 adaptation costs linearly; model refinements could accommodate non-linear discounting to 554 cover residual costs beyond the scope of mitigation. Further extensions of the model could 555 partition out self-insurance (to reduce costs) and self-protection (to reduce risk) from the 556 market-led mandatory insurance (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972 ), or could model insurance as a 557 public good (Lohse et al., 2012) . 558
Implications for UK policy 559
The UK government originally planned for a mandatory annual contribution that would add 560 about £50 to the average household energy bill (DECC, 2013). Achieving the £1.3bn annual 561 target for funding green-energy solutions would therefore allow no more than 2% defection 562 amongst the 26.4 million UK households. Such a small defection probability is an equilibrium 563 outcome given the Table-1 analysis has demonstrated the potential, in principle, for using insurance to incentivize 596 28 mitigation of risk. New Zealand's Earthquake Commission (EQC) is a government-regulated 597 insurance scheme for natural disasters including storms, floods, and tsunamis, which is an 598 obligatory component of insurance bought by all owners of residential dwellings and contents 599 in New Zealand. Although the EQC pays owners the value of damaged land or repair costs 600 following a natural disaster, the premium is not linked to mitigation or pre-emptive adaptation 601 such as we propose here, which has been considered as a lost opportunity for risk reduction 602 'parametric' insurance, which pays a predetermined remuneration when parameters are met 623 such as thresholds of hurricane category or average temperature. Reinsurance mechanisms 624 cover rare events that would otherwise leave obligations outstripping capital reserves. Instead 625 of responding to pre-established threats, parametric insurance with reinsurance prepares for 626 future-possible threats independently of their probability (Grove, 2012) . This makes it 627 particularly well suited to funding climate-change mitigation through securitized premium 628 discounts, because effective mitigation will reduce the frequency of threshold crossings. The 629 current absence of any such link to mitigation again represents a missed opportunity. 630
Conclusions
631
We have provided a simple game-theoretic framework for optimizing collective payments 632 towards climate-change mitigation. The method quantifies a currently ignored opportunity for 633 adaptation insurance to leverage collective mitigation through discounts in personal insurance 634 premiums. Although we have focused on insurance, any mechanism for bringing adaptation 635 costs into the present can leverage cooperation with mitigation. The analysis demonstrates the 636 effect of full and fair knowledge about adaptation costs in motivating preventative action for a 637 payoff-maximizing population. Mitigation achieves ambitious targets when it reduces 638 otherwise high costs of adaptation to climate change and it works even for anticipated 639 catastrophes otherwise considered uninsurable. The galvanizing effect of a potential debt 640 burden suffices alone, and independently of any coordinated responses, to align personal with 641 social interests. The prevailing absence of cover for a bleak future, however, perpetuates the 642 association of collective action with a social dilemma, overlooking its potential as an efficient 643 strategy for minimizing personal costs in adaptation. 644
